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The family gap in career progression 
Abstract: 
This study investigates whether and when during the life cycle women fall behind in terms of 
career progression because of children. We use 1987-1997 Norwegian panel data that contain 
information on individuals’ position in their career hierarchy as well as a direct measure of 
their promotions. We measure overall promotions as increases in rank within the same 
establishment as well as in combination with an establishment change. Women with children 
are 1.6 percentage points less likely promoted than women without children; this is what we 
refer to as the family gap in climbing the career. We find that mothers tend to enter on lower 
ranks than non-mothers. 37 percent of the gap can be explained by rank fixed effects and 
human capital characteristics. A large part remains unexplained. Graphical analyses show that 
part of the difference already evolves during the early career. Part of this seems related to the 
relatively low starting ranks.   
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1. Introduction 
Trends over the previous 50 years in wages of men and women demonstrate the strong 
convergence in wages leading to a reduction in the gender wage gap (see Jacobsen, 2014 this 
volume). The more recent 20 years, however, show that the gender wage gap has stalled at a 
significant and positive level. The level varies across the OECD countries. For Germany the 
gap is quite high, 23 percent, and for Norway and the other Scandinavian countries it is lowest, 
15 percent. Studies using data on male and female workers since first entry into the labor 
market have shown that men and women with the same education tend to enter at similar 
wage levels, but wages begin to diverge during the early career (Manning and Swaffield, 2008; 
Fitzenberger and Kunze, 2005). The male-female wage divergence increases substantially 
more after childbirth which can partly be related to work interruptions and reduced hours of 
work   (Mincer and Polachek, 1974; Bertrand et al. 2010). 
International studies have also shown that women with children earn less at the mean 
than childless women; this is often referred to as the family gap in pay (e.g. Harkness and 
Waldfogel, 1999). Previous evidence suggests that the family gap in pay develops in three 
phases. Women who will have children at some point in their lives enter at lower wages into 
the labor market (Lundberg and Rose, 2000). Mothers fall behind other women because of the 
drop in wages when they return to work following childbirth.1 In addition, several studies 
found that mother’s returns to experience are lower than before first childbirth and compared 
to non-mothers. 
Overall empirical evidence shows that women’s career progress is delayed or 
diminished because of children. Looking at the literature it is however noticeable that most of 
the longitudinal evidence is based on indirect measures of career progress or success such as 
individual wage growth or wage levels. This paper contributes to this literature by presenting 
                                                          
1 A drop in wages is consistent with a human capital framework, as is predicted in Polachek (1975). 
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new evidence on the family gap in career progress using a direct measure of career success. 
We use 1987-1997 Norwegian panel data that contain information on individuals’ position in 
their career hierarchy and allow us to measure promotions. We investigate the difference in 
promotion probability of women with and without children where promotions can take place 
internally within an establishment or in connection with a change of employer.  
The family pay gap may partly capture that women do not receive internal promotions 
or better positions when they move firms (external promotions). Existing research based on 
surveys such as the NLSY does not contain information on the hierarchies of firms and the 
position in the hierarchy the worker has. Hence, with such data we cannot measure whether 
promotion probabilities within rank are lower for mothers than for non-mothers. The panel 
data we use in this study contain detailed hierarchical information and cover the population of 
white collar workers in private sector establishments in Norway.   
The promotion of women more generally has not received much attention in the labor 
economics literature so far. But this is an important question in the debate why women are 
underrepresented in top management positions. Knowledge about promotions of women can 
also contribute to a deeper understanding of the remaining residual gender wage gap. 
Promotions are an important determinant of the returns to skills and hence can indirectly 
affect the decision to participate in the labor market. Women’s participation in the labor 
market is becoming of increasing importance in times of dramatic demographic changes 
particularly in the European economies.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section two surveys explanations 
of the family wage gap and the hypotheses that we will explore. Section three provides 
institutional background on Norway. Section four describes the data and presents descriptive 
statistics. Section five presents the empirical results. Section six concludes. 
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2. The family gap in wages and careers 
A number of studies investigated the impact of maternity leave and having children on the 
individual wage process. The most common approach to analyze the wage effect of having 
children has been to compare the wages of women with children to those of childless women 
holding productivity related characteristics constant. These include human capital 
characteristics, such as education and actual work experience, and parental leave as well as 
demographic variables that serve as proxies for leave taking. The difference in wages is often 
called the family gap.  
International studies find that the family gap varies across countries (Harkness and 
Waldfogel, 1999; Davies and Pierre, 2005; Dupuy and Kranz-Fernandez, 2011).2 In country 
studies a significant family gap is found for the US (see Anderson, Binder and Krause, 2002; 
Waldfogel, 1998), for the UK (see Joshi, Paci and Waldfogel, 1999) and for Canada (see 
Phipps, Burton and Lethbrigde, 2001).  For Norway, Hardøy and Schøne (2008) showed a 
moderate family gap. For the first child they found a decrease in wages of 1.4 percent that 
increases to 4 percent for the third child. Their estimates of the family wage gap are larger for 
the private sector than for the public sector. 3 No evidence of a family gap is found for 
Denmark (Datta Gupta and Smith, 2002; Simonsen and Skipper, 2012) and for Sweden 
(Albrecht et al., 1999).  
In this literature a number of hypotheses have been pursued to explain the family gap. 
Women typically interrupt work for a period after childbirth (Waldfogel, 1998). This implies 
a loss in terms of years of actual work experience compared to other workers of the same age.  
Interruptions may also have negative effects on earnings due to depreciation of human capital 
                                                          
2 Estimates of the family gap are difficult to compare across countries because of different data 
sources and definitions. Harkness and Waldfogel (1999) is the most comprehensive cross-country 
study using the Luxembourg Income study (LIS). They find that the raw family gap among full-time 
workers varies between 1.4 percent for Australia and 9.4 percent for Germany.  
3 Petersen, et al. (2010) found that for the private sector the within-job family gap is not significant 
suggesting that segregation on occupation and establishment are important explanatory factors.  
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(Mincer and Polachek, 1974; Albrecht et al., 1999).  Such effects are expected to be relatively 
strong in technology intensive occupations. 4 In addition to human capital effects through 
observed factors, heterogeneity in terms of unobserved characteristics, or unobserved ability, 
may explain part of the family gap too if these factors are correlated with fertility (Lundberg 
and Rose, 2000; Simonsen and Skipper, 2012).  Non-random selection into sectors and type of 
jobs may also be related to the observed mother-non-mother earnings difference if for 
example high and low wage jobs differ in terms of family friendliness or other non-monetary 
characteristics (Joshi et al., 1999; Datta Gupta and Smith, 2000; Nielsen et al., 2004), Felfe, 
2012). Not all women return to work for an extended period post-childbirth and the selection 
of returning women may not be random which will also bias the family gap (Ejrnæs and 
Kunze, 2013). 
 Other factors that may explain the relatively low earnings of mothers can be related to 
low mobility of mothers and that women with children remain in low worker-job matches 
(Waldfogel, 1998; Phipps et al., 2001).  If mothers are less likely to search for new jobs 
because of high search costs, for example, they may remain in jobs that are a bad match and 
only slowly improve the quality of their job match. Evidence shows that young women both 
in the US and Germany search longer for a job than men after an exogenous plant closure 
(Kunze and Troske, 2012; Kunze and Troske, 2014). This leads to lower earnings compared 
to similar childless women. Since the fertility period often clashes with the early career, the 
loss due to motherhood might depend on the timing of childbirth in relation to the labor 
market career. Related to this point, Waldfogel (1998) and Phipps et al. (2001) find that 
returning to the same employer after maternity leave actually has a positive effect on wages, 
but this might be because staying with the same employer actually acts as a kind of insurance 
against income loss. Waldfogel (1998) also finds that the size of wage loss due to taking 
                                                          
4 In an earlier study, Polachek (1981) showed evidence of considerable variation of the depreciation 
rate across different occupations. 
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maternity leave depends on whether the woman was covered by a maternity leave scheme. 
Most of this literature does not fully account for the endogeneity of fertility decisions to the 
wage process (Heckman and Walker, 1990). Exceptions are Angrist and Evans (1998), Hotz 
et al. (2005) and Miller (2011) that use plausibly exogenous instruments to separate the 
effects at selected parity.  Even after controlling for a lot of these factors many studies still 
find the significant drop in wages after childbirth. This might be interpreted as employer 
discrimination.  
 Another interpretation of the earnings drop we observe post-childbirth or the lower 
relative earnings of women with children compared to women without children is that women 
are downgraded in terms of career levels post-childbirth. When looking at the mean earnings 
growth in the period post-childbirth we observe that a woman never returns to her pre-
childbirth earnings growth path. This implies that rebound effects are not sufficiently strong 
(see e.g., Jacobsen et al., 1995). 
 The family pay gap literature indicates that women cannot continue on the career 
progress they made before first becoming a mother, and when they return to work after 
childbirth they have to start from a lower level. In fact they may never return to the career 
path during the very early career. This might be because they step down in terms of 
occupation. The literature on the question whether women step down in terms of career or 
occupation is scarce. 
Recent exceptions are Manning and Petrongolo (2008) and Conolly and Gregory 
(2008) showing that part-time work leads to downgrading in terms of occupation. Since part-
time is often used by women to reconcile work and family, this finding is relevant for the 
post-childbirth period. Ejrnæs and Kunze (2013) also found a dip in earnings 1-2 years 
actually before having the first work interruption related to childbirth. An explanation could 
be that women downgrade their career already before becoming a mother. Studies showing a 
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positive entry earnings differential between childless women and others suggest further that 
from the beginning of careers women who will become a mother later in life sort into 
different career tracks (Mincer and Polachek, 1974). Related is also the question of 
promotions and what determines promotions. Promotions can be viewed as the outcome of 
internal tournaments, external labor markets and human capital investments (see Gibbons and 
Waldman, 1999 for an overview). Since women often work part-time around childbirth or 
take periods of leave they may as well experience relatively less job promotions. This may 
vary across occupations and Goldin (2014) made the point that the flexibility in terms of 
working hours alongside other dimensions plays an important role in understanding women’s 
relatively lower positions in the labor market.   
This study contributes to this literature by analyzing direct career outcomes for women 
followed over time in the private sector. We model career promotions as linear regressions 
where the dependent variable is a binary variable that is equal to one if the change in rank 
between period t and t+1 is positive and zero otherwise. The main explanatory variables are 
human capital characteristics measured in period t, but we also use establishment 
characteristics and fixed effects. We use information from Norwegian employer-employee 
register data merged with survey data that allow us to construct a direct measure of career 
progression - promotions on job ladders. Using these data we will investigate the following 
selected hypotheses related to career breaks explaining family gap:  
I. Do women who have children start on different ranks than women who do not have 
children? 
II. Is there a family gap in career progress when we use overall promotions? 
III. Are women promoted less likely after having children than comparable women? 
IV. Does the family gap in promotions arise after having children, or already before?  
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The analysis builds on the detailed information of occupations and ranks and the fact that we 
observe the population of white collar workers in a large sample of enterprises. Estimations 
build on the family pay gap literature. 
 
3. Background 
In this section we describe main Norwegian institutions relevant as background for work and 
family: working hours and part time work, the provision of parental leave and child care for 
pre-school children and children in primary school.  
 The typical worker in Norway works 5 days a week and 37.5 hours per week. Part 
time work is common among women with young children; not so for men.  Norway has a 
generous parental leave system where part of the parental leave is reserved to the mother; that 
is 3 weeks before childbirth and 6 weeks after childbirth. In 1987, the first year of our 
observation window, parents could take in total 100 days after birth paid leave from work. 
Except the 6 weeks after childbirth, parents can share the leave; but in practice it was mothers 
taking leave from work. Gradually from 1989 to 1993 the duration of total parental leave (incl. 
maternity leave) was expanded. In 1992 the duration amounted to 165 days.  
An important reform took action on 1 April 1993 when leave was extended to 42 
weeks (=294 days) of paid leave with the choice to receive 100 per cent wage compensation 
when one takes 42 weeks of leave, or 80 percent when one takes 52 weeks. In order to be 
eligible the mother has to be employed during 6 out of 10 months immediately prior to birth.5 
Another aspect that makes the 1993 reform remarkable is the introduction of 4 weeks 
of paid leave that were reserved for the father and could normally be not transferred to the 
mother. Hence, if the couple chooses 42 weeks of leave, then 29(=42-6-3-4) weeks of leave 
can be freely shared between the mother and father. If the father would not use the 4 weeks 
                                                          
5 Until 1993 leave could only be taken full-time, that was modified in 1994. Otherwise the law of 1993 
has been in place unchanged until 2005.  
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the total benefits to the couple would be reduced by those 4 weeks. The 1993 reform was 
rather interesting since until 1993 virtually no father (3-5 per cent) in Norway took any 
parental leave and all went to the mother.  In 1993 the take up by fathers of leave jumped to 
33 per cent and this proportion steadily increased to 85 per cent by 1998. The average 
duration of leave is 24 days and has remained stable during this period (Lappegård, 2008). 
The change in father’s leave has therefore been small and little consequence for our analysis. 
During the period 1987 to 1997 publicly subsidized child care was not available for 
everybody. In the 1970s the government decided that the goal is to expand child care to full 
coverage but this goal was not reached for 1 to 6 years old before 2006. In 1987 approx. 11 
per cent of 1-2 years old went to public child care and 44 per cent of the 3-7 years old. Until 
1997, children started school at age 7. Towards the end of our observation period coverage 
has significantly increased to 21 per cent for the 1-2 years old and 47 per cent for the older 
pre-school children. These are only official numbers for use of public child care mostly 
organized in kindergartens. In addition, a substantial fraction of parents used nannies (dag 
mamas) for child care and those informal forms of childcare did not receive a public subsidy. 
Overall, the provision of parental leave and child care provide fairly good conditions by 
international standard to combine family and work. It is less clear however whether these are 
also good conditions for women climbing to top positions, and breaking the glass ceiling. Our 
analysis provides some pieces of evidence towards this question. 
During the period of observation 1987 to 1997, Norway underwent a recession until 
1993 when unemployment peaked at 6.7 per cent and decreased to approx. 3 percent by 1997. 
Throughout this period labor force participation rates remained high for men, 74-80 percent. 
For women LFP was 63 percent in 1987 and increased to 67 percent in 1997 (Source: SSB 
AKU data – the Norwegian labor force survey). 
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4. Data description and summary statistics. 
For the empirical analyses, we use the Norwegian matched employer-employee register data 
for white collar workers combined with information on ranks within the establishment 
hierarchy. This particular variable was constructed from information in an establishment level 
survey conducted by the NHO (Næringslivets Hovedorganisasjon - Confederation of 
Norwegian Enterprise) and is available for the population of white collar employees within 
establishments that are members of NHO. The members are in the private sector, including 
manufacturing, construction and machinery, oil, transport, and hotels and restaurants. The 
NHO data covers a large part of the private sector. NHO firms tend to be larger and older than 
the average private sector firm in Norway. Employees tend to be more educated and hence 
earn on average more. 
 The data are yearly and the analysis period in this study is from 1987 until 1997, 
which is the longest period for which all of the key variables are available.6 During this period 
we follow workers born between 1936 and 19697 and we only use white collar workers. There 
are very few female blue collar workers in these sectors. Workers are followed over the entire 
period if they are employed with one of the establishments in the NHO data. In this data 
sample approximately 30 per cent of all workers are women.  
Variables that we use in the analyses are the individual characteristics age, educational 
attainment in years, whether an individual has children or not and the timing of first 
childbirth 8, establishment identifier and characteristics such as sector and size which we 
measure by the number of white collar workers at the establishment in year t. The variable 
earnings per hour is constructed from information in the register data on monthly earnings and 
                                                          
6 Before 1987, only limited register information is available from Statistics Norway. After 1997, the 
NHO ceased collecting the data.  
7 The birth cohorts 1936 to 1969 are those who can potentially be followed during the 10 year 
observation window. 
8 Since for the analysis of the family gap we will compare mothers versus non-mothers all women with 
and without children add to these groups. Note that only for a sub-sample we observe a first childbirth 
during the observations window.  
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from the survey on normal hours of work. The normal hours of work exclude overtime hours, 
and earnings are from work and benefit claims excluding overtime payments. Education is 
defined as the years of completed education. Part-time work is defined as less than 37 hours 
of work per week. The year of birth of the first child is generated from the birth register where 
for every individual in Norway all births are reported. We count years of experience as the 
accumulated number of actual years of work and tenure as these within the same 
establishment.  
The summary statistics for our data sample are presented in Table 1. We find that 
mothers are older at the mean than childless women. This reflects that we use the current 
number of children, not completed fertility, which is in line with the literature on family gap. 
Women with children are much more likely to work part-time than the average woman, 33 
percent compared to 26 percent. This is also reflected in the exact hours of contracted work. 
Women with children have accumulated more work experience and tenure.  
To measure career progress on the job ladder we use seven ranks that define the 
hierarchy and are applied to every establishment in our sample. The variable is constructed 
from detailed job descriptions of 6 occupational groups. For each of the occupational groups 
up to seven hierarchical ranks are distinguished. The 6 occupational groups cover: technical 
white-collar, manager, administrative, task in shop, in storage and others. Within each 
occupational group, task levels (ranks) are distinguished starting with unskilled work, routine 
type of jobs on the lowest rank and positions with great responsibility and skill requirements 
on the top rank. In total there are 22 occupation-ranks which pre-define our cells. These are 
merged by us into 7 ranks where we use the information on tasks, responsibilities etc. in the 
detailed job descriptions. 9 In the resulting hierarchy grid of 7 ranks, the highest rank (rank 7) 
                                                          
9 A similar definition was first used in Hunnes, et al. (2009) who investigate the structure of wages in 
Norway. For further details on the definition of ranks and the measurement of promotions see Kunze 
and Miller (2014). Kunze and Miller (2014) focus on gender differences in promotions and gender 
spillover effects across ranks. This study has a different focus on family gap and the use of the 
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includes technical directors and leading positions. On rank six, for example, chief engineers 
and plant managers are located. The decrease of the rank on the job ladder reflects that the 
complexity of tasks, responsibility and leadership task responsibilities decline as well. On 
rank 2, for example, technicians and cashiers are located. The lowest rank (rank 1) contains 
only unskilled, more routine tasks in technical and clerical fields. This hierarchy grid that 
matches the information on occupational groups and ranks to hierarchy ranks is then merged 
to the employer-employee matched data in which we follow workers from year to year during 
the 10 year window.  
An advantage of our data is that the seven ranks are consistently defined across 
establishments and time within establishments.10 Hence, we can exploit the panel data to 
observe how workers change rank. We define a promotion or move up the career ladder of a 
worker as an increase in the observed rank from year-to-year11; we refer to this as an overall 
promotion in the following.  This measure accounts for within establishment move up the 
career ladder as well as between establishment changes. The comparison group contains those 
staying on the same rank and those with a decrease of the rank.12  
As Table 1 shows at the mean 6.3 percent of women are promoted per year if we count 
both internal promotions and promotions related to an establishment change. The promotion 
probability is significantly lower for women with children, 5.6 percent. This is the family gap 
in career progress that we are going to explore. If we would only count internal promotions 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition in order to investigate the factors that explain the family gap. While 
this study focuses entirely on overall promotions, as a measure of career progress, Kunze and Miller 
(2014) also investigate internal promotions. 
10 Other studies, such as in the field of personnel economics, usually have such information only for a 
single (large) plant. Further, while studies using representative surveys, like the British Household 
Panel Survey (BHPS), rely on multiple firm data, they often observe only one worker for every firm. 
See, for example, Francesconi (2001) and Booth et al. (2003). 
11 In this study, we only use this defintion of promotion. We acknowledge that the measure depends on 
observed rank changes. Wage increases within rank are not labelled as a promotion. 
12 As we see from the promotion regressions, rank increases accrue not simply on the base of seniority 
rules, but many of the factors we control for have a significant impact on promotions. This is in line 
with theory that predicts that human capital, external labor market factors, and tournaments affect 
promotion decision outcomes. 
14 
 
then the probability of career success would decrease by approximately 15 percent, and a 
family gap would remain. In the following we will focus on the more comprehensive 
definition of career success based on overall promotions. The data show that most of the 
workers (87 percent on average) stay on the same rank from year to year. Moves down the 
career ladder are rare, but more common the higher the rank is.  
The employer characteristics reported in Table 1 show that the mean number of white 
collar workers in the establishments is 18. Note that not all of the establishments have 7 ranks 
and the depth of organization varies across establishments and industries. At the mean across 
establishments, the top rank is 3 and the lowest rank 1.6.  
 
5. Empirical results 
5.1. The starting position of women’s careers 
A potential explanation for women with children doing worse than women without children is 
that they start on lower positions when they first enter the labor market. These positions may 
offer more flexibility in terms of hours of work, for example, but also fewer opportunities for 
earnings gains and promotions.  
We define the entry position as the first job in the labor market after completion of 
education as we observe it in the data. However, we cannot observe the entry position for 
every individual in our sample since the observation window only covers a 10 year period and 
many have entered the labor market before they enter our data set.  In order to have a large 
sample of individuals we use all first observations where the individual is younger than 30 
years of age.  
In Table 2 we show the distribution across entry ranks and main mean characteristics 
within each rank by motherhood status. Out of 18079 women in our sample 72 percent 
women have no children at this stage and 28 percent have children. The distribution of 
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women across entry ranks shows that more than 50 percent are on the two lowest ranks. The 
proportion of women with children is slightly higher on those positions, 58 percent. On rank 3 
we find 32.8 percent of mothers but slightly more (36.5 percent) of non-mothers. Differences 
on the next higher rank 4 also show that the proportion of women without children is higher, 
11.2 percent compared to 8.6 percent. It is extremely rare to be on ranks 5 and 6 in the entry 
job, as less than 1 percent are on these positions. Taken together, these statistics do suggest 
that women younger than 30 are more likely on lower positions if they have children.  
These differences could be related to human capital characteristics. We could observe 
such a pattern if mothers invest less in education. It could also be that mothers in the entry 
sample are younger. When we look at the mean age of the two groups we find that mothers 
are actually slightly older than women without children within the same rank. The age 
difference is largest on ranks 1 and 2. We also note that mothers have at the mean a higher 
number of years of education than non-mothers. This holds on every rank except for ranks 1 
and 2 where the years of education for mothers are lower. On ranks 1 and 2 are workers who 
work in unskilled clerical and technical jobs so that it makes a lot of sense that relatively low 
education may be compensated for by years of (potential) work experience, as we see for 
mothers. Despite the fact that mothers and non-mothers on the same rank differ with respect 
to years of education and age, the most frequent occupation for the two groups within rank are 
the same. Note that on all ranks there are 2 to 6 different occupations, except for rank 5 where 
there is only one. When we take into account differences in characteristics between non-
mothers and mothers, we also confirm that mothers are entering the career ladder on a lower 
rank than non-mothers (see Appendix Table A1 where we report the results from an ordered 
probit regression for entry rank).  
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5.2. The decomposition of the family gap in career progression 
The dummy variable approach 
In order to estimate the family gap in career progression we use as the outcome our measure 
of overall promotions. The variable takes the value 1 if for the person in a given year the rank 
variable increases by at least 1 unit from year to year. It takes the value zero otherwise. This 
means that we count all promotions within the same establishment as well as in connection 
with an establishment change. In Table 3 we present the estimates from a linear probability 
model.13 Column 1in Table 3 reports the unconditional difference. In columns 2 to 5we report 
the results from regressions where we sequentially add a set of control variables holding 
constant individual differences as well as establishment characteristics. 
The raw mother-non-mother difference is the coefficient of the dummy variable, 
which is 1 if the person is a mother, or has at least one child. The difference is negative and 
significant. Since this is a simple linear probability model we interpret the coefficient as a 
difference of 1.6 percentage points (column 1). The average promotion probability among 
women is 6.3 percent (Table 1) and therefore the raw family gap is 25 percent [(1.6/6.3)*100]. 
Differences in the distribution across ranks and years do not change this finding. Note, that 
the regression controls for characteristics in the year before the outcome promotion is 
measured, which is essentially a first difference in rank. This implies that the rank variable 
among the explanatory variables always measures the rank the woman is starting from. This is 
slightly different from the entry rank we looked at in Table 2. We seem however not to 
confirm the conjecture that differences in entry ranks of mothers and non-mothers contribute a 
lot to the family gap. The productivity related characteristics age, education, tenure, 
experience and part time work account for 37.5 percent of the total gap [(0.016-
                                                          
13 We also estimate a logit model which gives qualitatively and quantitatively similar results. The 
results are available on request. 
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0.01)/0.016*100]. When we add in establishment fixed specific effects the explained part 
increases slightly more.  
These results show that the family gap in career progress exists but differences in 
observed individual characteristics contribute to those differences. Part of these differences 
accrues indirectly to having children. These factors are parental leave that reduces experience 
and tenure, and part time jobs that women often work in post-childbirth. Establishment fixed 
effects may matter significantly if establishments differ, for example, in terms of family-
friendly policies. Since the point estimate does not change significantly when we control for 
establishment fixed effects, sorting into establishments seems to matter little. Hence, one 
interpretation of these results is that mothers do not work in establishments that offer careers 
with less promotion opportunities, which we may often expect from more family friendly 
establishments.  
The Oaxaca-Blinder (O-B) decomposition of the family gap 
The regression results discussed so far simply estimate the family gap by a dummy 
variable approach and differences in returns to characteristics are not taken into account. In 
the next step we want to allow for such differences and decompose the family gap in career 
progress into an explained part due to observed endowments and into an unexplained part (the 
residual) due to differences in coefficients by estimation of the Oaxaca-Blinder (O-B) 
decomposition (Oaxaca, 1973; Blinder, 1973). In the first step, we estimate linear promotion 
regressions separately for mothers and non-mothers. The estimated coefficients are then used 
to estimate the explained part and the residual or unexplained part. The results of the 
decomposition are presented in Table 4. As weights the estimated coefficients for non-
mothers are used.  
Panel 1 in Table 4 presents the decomposition results using our full sample. Column 
1reports the absolute accumulated contribution of differences in endowments when we only 
18 
 
control for rank, year and industry. Even though we saw that mothers and non-mothers are 
quite differently distributed across ranks at entry, the contribution to the explanation of the 
raw family gap is now not significant and the total contribution is close to zero. In column 2 
we add to the set of explanatory variables age and education. We now can explain 0.003 of 
the total gap by differences in these characteristics. That is within rank and industry. Keeping 
in mind that the raw family gap is 0.016, 18 percent of the total gap can now be explained. In 
column 3 we add variables measuring actual work experience, tenure, and whether someone 
worked part-time. The explained part becomes approximately twice as high. In terms of the 
raw family gap, 37 percent can now be explained. Hence, the more flexible decomposition 
shows that almost 40 percent of the observed family gap in career progression can be 
explained by differences in characteristics between non-mothers and mothers. Because 
women with children have lower mean values in those characteristics they did not progress as 
likely as non-mothers on the career ladder.  Critical is that the decomposition also shows that 
60 per cent is unexplained by the differences in endowments. It is difficult to tell what exactly 
causes differences in the coefficients. In a descriptive sense it means that women with 
children gain less in terms of an increase of the likelihood to be promoted from, for example, 
an additional year of experience. These differences in estimated coefficients are difficult to 
interpret14 and in the simple O-B decomposition they may result from omitted variable bias. 
An example for an omitted factor is effort. Women with children may reallocate effort from 
work to home which reduces the return to experience per year. Differences in coefficients 
may also result from statistical discrimination. 
 
5.3 The effect of children on career progression 
                                                          
14  This is an important problem that has long been noted and discussed in the literature on the 
decomposition of gender wage gap. See e.g. Polachek (1975).  
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In this section we want to investigate the effect of years since first childbirth on overall career 
progress. In Table 5a we present estimation results for our main outcome variable overall 
promotions. For comparison, we also report results in Table 5b when we use earnings. 
We estimate from linear promotion regressions the effect of years since first childbirth 
where we break up years into year at birth, 1-2 years since childbirth, 3-4 and 5 and more 
years since childbirth. Column 1 presents the base estimate. In the other columns control 
variables are added. First, the control variables include a quadratic in age, years of education 
and cohort-year fixed effects. Then, we add a dummy variable for part-time work and 
establishment fixed effects. Finally, we add individual fixed effects and rank-year fixed 
effects. To test robustness of our results we also add in alternative specifications 
establishment fixed effects and rank-year fixed effects.  
The main finding is that women after childbirth are less likely to be promoted than 
women without children. Specification 1 shows that the effect controlling for the basic 
characteristics is 3 percentage points during the immediate year after childbirth then decreases 
to 2.1 to 2.5 percentage points 1 to 4 years after childbirth and 1.8 percentage points per year 
5 years or more after childbirth.  Controlling for part-time work, specification 2, does not 
change this finding. This may show that the variable for years since childbirth fully captures 
related effects already. Controlling for individual fixed effects in the regression, specification 
3, absorbs most of the negative longer run effects of entry into motherhood.  Now only short 
run effects of first childbirth are significant and negative. These are the effects for workers 
with the same education, of the same age and takes also into account cohort-year specific 
effects. Some of these workers will have further children and we do not account for the exact 
number of children. Estimates suggest however that the effect works entirely through entry 
into first motherhood. Specifications 4 and 5 are further robustness checks whether other 
fixed factors can explain the differential effects of years since childbirth. As can be seen, the 
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reported coefficients become again more similar to those in specifications 1 and 2 when we 
drop individual specific effects and instead control for establishment fixed effects. The same 
holds when we control for rank-year fixed effects. This shows that factors that are unobserved 
to us and captured by the individual specific factors are important to understand changes post 
childbirth.   
 It could be that women trade career progress for wages. For example, women may 
change to career tracks that are less likely to lead to a promotion. Therefore, we present for 
comparison the estimation results when we replace in the above model the outcome variable 
by hourly earnings.  The main finding is that women with children post-childbirth earn less 
than comparable women without children. Specification 3 in Table 5b reports the individual 
fixed effect estimate.  We find that the effect of years since childbirth is significant and 
negative and smoothly but moderately increasing from an earnings loss of 0.9 per cent per 
year to 1.7 percent per year 5 years or more after childbirth. Even though these are moderate 
earnings losses by international comparison, they are still significant. Overall this shows that 
women with children lose in terms of promotions and in terms of earnings. The data do not 
allow us to test whether wage losses are traded for other job characteristics that make those 
jobs more attractive to women, for example, in terms of work flexibility. 
 
5.4 Careers over time, and before and after having children   
So far we have investigated the family gap at the mean and after childbirth in the regression 
analysis. In the following graphical analysis we want to investigate further when the family 
gap evolves and how it evolves when we follow women over time. In Figure 1 we plot the 
(unconditional) probability to be promoted by years of work experience for women with and 
without children separately.  
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Figure 1a shows that differences between the groups appear during the early career 
that is during the first 8 to 10 years in the labor market. When we look at later stages in the 
careers women with and women without children have equal promotion probability. The 
graph suggests that this differential is driven by women who become mothers during the first 
10 years of their career.  Since women in our sample are in their mid to late 20s at the mean at 
first entry job (Table 2), we do not think that this difference is driven by extremely young 
mothers. When we split up the sample into those who enter the first job on ranks 1 and 2, 
versus higher levels then we see that the differential is highly related to the entry rank. This is 
shown in Figures 1b and 1c. When we look at women who entered ranks above rank 2 then 
the differential becomes graphically non-significant. This may show that ranks 1 and 2 are 
lock-in jobs, or may capture other characteristics such as low education. As ranks 1 and 2 are 
defined, they contain jobs where unskilled or low skilled tasks are performed. Average years 
of education and age are also lower for workers on those ranks (Table 2).  
The figures suggest that the workers on ranks 1 and 2 are different from the remaining 
workers and that may drive the family gap decomposition results. Therefore we re-estimated 
the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of the family gap dropping workers starting from ranks 1 
or 2. The results are reported in panel 2 of Table 4.   
We find that the overall family gap is lower, 0.6, and amounts to only 42 percent of 
the raw family gap in the full sample. We find that women with children are relatively better 
endowed in terms of rank and industry, and therefore these characteristics explain in sum a 
negative fraction of the total family gap. The explained part increases as we add 
characteristics to the set of explanatory variables. When we control for the full set of controls 
we can account for 59 percent of the family gap. This is larger than when we include those 
workers starting from rank 1 or 2. However, we still have a significant raw family gap and 
still 40 percent remain unexplained by the set of controls.  
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6. Conclusions 
In this study we analyzed the question whether women with children are less likely promoted 
than women without children and, if so, why do we observe these differences. In short, why is 
there a family gap in career progress? In the process, we investigate when during the life cycle 
these job promotions occur. For the analysis we use Norwegian data for the period 1987 to 
1997. We take into account that women with children may be different from other women in 
terms of labor market histories. As an extension to the literature we explore to what extent 
mothers progress more slowly on their career ladders than non-mothers. 
Overall, women with children are 22 percent less likely promoted than women without 
children in our sample period 1987 to 1997. Most compelling is the evidence that work 
experience, work tenure and part-time work explain a considerable part of the gap. When we 
control for as many factors as we can, we can explain 37 percent of the total family gap. The 
explained proportion increases to 59 percent when we focus on those on middle and high 
ranks. This demonstrates the increased importance of human capital accumulation the higher 
one is on the career ladder. The results also show that continuous work attachment is 
important for career progression in the private sector. Hence, women with children fall behind 
because they work less hours during episodes of their work histories, and have interruptions. 
Both these factors lead to lower levels of work experience and tenure. Nevertheless, a large 
part of the family gap remains unexplained.  
We find these career advancement differences evolve during one’s career. Women 
with children tend to start lower on the hierarchy than women without children. Differences in 
the probability to be promoted seem to arise particularly during the first 10 years in the labor 
market. Some of that seems related to the group of women on the two lowest ranks in the 
hierarchies of the private sector establishments that we look at. These are typically low or 
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unskilled jobs. Possible explanations are selection, if low educated workers are selected into 
those jobs, or lock-in-effects, if women never manage to exit those low positions because of 
low work attachment early on during the career, for example, because of interruptions related 
to childbirths. More research and more extensive data material are needed to investigate this 
in greater detail. 
The evidence we present in this study contributes to the wider literature on differences 
between mothers and non-mothers in the labor market. So far the literature showed that 
women with children have lower entry wages than women without children. The results in 
this study suggest that these may partly be related to differences in entry ranks. Our findings 
showing that work experience, tenure and full-time work are important determinants of 
promotions are in line with the evidence in the literature on the family wage gap. Taken 
together these results suggest that women may forgo important promotions around the period 
when they have children and this also may have short and longer run effects on their wage 
paths.  
What we learn from the findings of this study is that policies aiming at improving the 
work - family balance are possibly not only about employment and wages of women. We 
show that a family gap in career progression exists too and that women with children fall 
behind on the career ladder if they work part-time or have less work experience. If women 
with children would close the gap in work experience, tenure and full-time work towards 
childless women, they would increase the probability to be promoted by 19 percentage points. 
The gain would be even larger if positioned on middle or high ranks in the career ladder. A 
policy suggestion we can draw from this evidence is that both policy makers and firms have 
to become aware that part-time work and work interruptions through parental leave reduces 
the likelihood to be promoted. This is therefore an additional and important aspect in the 
debate of why we have so few women in higher rank positions in the private industry. In order 
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to explore how widespread it is, it would be interesting to provide a comparative study. 
Particularly, it would be interesting to analyze outcomes in countries where the institutions 
that facilitate the combination of family and work are different.  
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Table 1: Summary statistics, women
Mean Std.dev. Mean Std.dev.
Individual characteristics
1 if Mother 0.565 1.000
Age 37.20 9.49 38.40 7.80
Years of education 11.60 2.26 11.50 2.20
Contracted hours of work 35.20 5.70 34.20 6.60
1 if Part-time work (less than 30 hours of work) 0.26 0.44 0.33 0.47
Years of experience 14.50 6.78 15.60 5.80
Years of tenure 5.76 4.57 6.00 4.52
log(hourly earnings) 4.54 0.23 4.56 0.23
Rank in the hierarchy (rank 1(low) to 7(top)) 2.56 1.21 2.55 1.23
1 if overall promotion (all) 0.063 0.243 0.056 0.230
1 if internal promotion 0.053 0.224 0.048 0.214
Selected employer characteristics
Employer size 17.60 66.80 18.30 70.70
Highest rank 3.00 1.40 3.00 1.46
Lowest rank 1.60 0.90 1.60 0.90
Number of observations 211844 119647
All Women Women with children
Table 2: Entry ranks* and mean characteristics, by motherhood status
Rank
Non-
mothers Mother
Non-
mother Mothers
Non-
mother Mothers Non-mothers Mothers
7 (Top) . . . . . .
6 0.5 0.5 27.9 28.2 13.9 14.3
head of 
department 
head of 
department
5 0.1 0.1 27.9 29.0 15.8 16.5
chief of 
department
chief of 
department
4 11.2 8.6 26.4 27.5 12.7 13.9 accountant accountant
3 36.5 32.8 25.2 27.0 11.6 12.1
skilled, account 
clerk
skilled, account 
clerk
2 16.8 18.1 23.6 26.8 12.3 11.6 various various
1 (Bottom) 34.8 39.8 23.6 26.2 11.6 11.4 clerical unskilled clearical unskilled
Most frequent occupation groupEducationAge%
Note: *Entry rank is the first rank observed in the individual time series excluding all observations for those who are older than 30. 
Mothers are those with a positive number of children. The entry sample contains 14087 non-mothers and 3992 mothers.
1 2 3 4 5
Coef (s.e.) Coef. (s.e.) Coef (s.e.) Coef. (s.e.) Coef.(s.e.)
1 if Mother -0.016 -0.016 -0.013 -0.010 -0.009
(0.0013)*** (0.0013)*** (0.0012)*** (0.0013)*** (0.0013)***
Rank, Year and Industry fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Age, Education No No Yes Yes Yes
Experience, Tenure, Part-time Work No No No Yes Yes
Establishment fixed effect No No No No Yes
Number of observations 211844 211844 211844 211844 211844
R-squared 0.001 0.025 0.039 0.041 0.052
Table 3: The family gap in career progression (LPM regression results: Binary outcome variable is moving up 
or not) - Dummy variable estimates
Note. Reported standard errors are clustered at the establishment-year-individual level. * p<0.05,  ** p<0.01,  
*** p<0.001
Table 4: Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of the family gap: Outcome overall promotion
Absolute 
contribution z-value
Absolute 
contribution z-value
Absolute 
contribution z-value
Raw Difference 0.0161 0.0161 0.0161
Endowment (total) -0.0005 -1.32 0.0028 3.82 0.0060 7.85
Coefficient (total) 0.0167 13.49 0.0133 10.89 0.0100 8.01
Percentage explained 0% 18% 37%
Number of Observations 211844 211844 211844
Raw Difference 0.0068 0.0068 0.0068
Endowment (total) -0.0016 -4.12 0.0002 0.25 0.0020 2.39
Coefficient (total) 0.0084 5.59 0.0066 4.52 0.0040 3.19
Percentage explained -23% 3% 59%
Number of observations 114644 114644 114644
Explantory variables:
Rank fixed effects X  X X
Year fixed effects X  X X
Industry fixed effects X X X
Age fixed effects X X
Education fixed effects X X
Years of experience (squared) X
Yrs of tenure (squared) X
Part-time work (less than 37 hours per week) X
Number of observations 211844 211844 211844
1 2 3
Note: Linear promotion regressions are estimated in the first stage separately for non-mothers and mothers. For the decomposition the 
coefficients from the non-mother regression are used as weights.  
Panel1: Decomposition for the base sample
Panel 2: Decomposition for the sample that excludes those on ranks 1 and 2
Table 5a: Impact of years since the birth of first child on the promotion probability of females
Coef. (s.e.) Coef. (s.e.) Coef. (s.e.) Coef. (s.e.) Coef. (s.e.)
Year after birth of first child
immediate -0.030 (0.004) -0.030 (0.003) -0.016 (0.004) -0.029 (0.004) -0.032 (0.004)
1 or 2 -0.025 (0.003) -0.024 (0.003) -0.008 (0.004) -0.024 (0.004) -0.028 (0.003)
3 or 4 -0.021 (0.004) -0.020 (0.004) 0.001 (0.005) -0.020 (0.004) -0.025 (0.004)
5 or more -0.018 (0.002) -0.018 (0.002) 0.008 (0.007) -0.016 (0.002) -0.023 (0.002)
Part-time work (less than 37 hours per week) No  Yes No No No
Person fixed effects No No Yes No No
Establishment fixed effects No No No Yes
R-squared 0.02 0.02 0.19 0.21 0.05
Number of observations 211844 211844 211844 211844 211844
Table 5b. Impact of years since the birth of first child on the hourly earnings of females
Coef. (s.e.) Coef. (s.e.) Coef. (s.e.) Coef. (s.e.) Coef. (s.e.)
Year after birth of the first child
immediate -0.010 (0.002) -0.010 (0.002) -0.009 (0.001) -0.007 (0.002) -0.012 (0.002)
1 or 2 -0.003 (0.002) -0.002 (0.002) -0.011 (0.001) -0.003 (0.002) -0.004 (0.002)
3 or 4 -0.001 (0.003) 0.000 (0.003) -0.014 (0.001) -0.004 (0.003) -0.001 (0.002)
5 or more -0.026 (0.001) -0.026 (0.001) -0.017 (0.002) -0.015 (0.001) -0.015 (0.001)
Part-time work (less than 37 hours per week) No  Yes No No No
Person fixed effects No No Yes No No
Establishment fixed effects No No No Yes
R-squared 0.46 0.46 0.96 0.68 0.66
Number of observations 211844 211844  223829 211844 223829
Rank-Year fixed effects
1 2 3 4 5
1 2 3 4 5
  
Rank-Year fixed effects
Note: All regressions control for (year*cohort) dummy variables, age and age squared and dummy variables for years of education. 
Figure 1a: Unconditional probability to be promoted (overall promotions)
Figure 1b: Unconditional probability to be promoted 
(overall promotions) if starting rank 1 or 2 
Figure 1c: Unconditional probability to be promoted 
(overall promotions) if starting rank 3 and above 
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Appendix Table A1: Ordered probit regressions for entry rank 
Coef (s.e.) Coef. (s.e.) Coef (s.e.)
1 if Mother -0.15 -0.23 -0.22
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Industry + Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Age, Education No yes Yes
Exp., Tenure, Part-Time No No Yes
Number of observations 18079 18079 18079
R-squared 0.01 0.10 0.11
Note: Entry rank can take the value 1(lowest rank) to 7 (top rank). 
Coefficients and standard errors are reported. 
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